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1 Introduction 
 
The economic organization of agriculture is a timely research topic. Among other 
organizational forms, cooperatives have always been a prominent organizational form. 
Broadly defined, a cooperative is an organizational form of many independent growers 
(horizontal relationship) who jointly own a downstream processor / retailer (vertical 
relationship). Cooperatives are important to agriculture in developed as well as 
developing countries. For example, there are 132,000 cooperatives with 83.5 million 
members and 2.3 million employees in the European Union in 2001, 47,000 cooperatives 
with 100 million members in the United States of America in 2001, and 94,771 
cooperatives with 1,193 million members in China in 2002. 
Studying agricultural cooperatives in China is of particular interest for three 
reasons. First, as noted by the new institutional economists such as North and Williamson 
for a long time, the institutional environment interacts with the governance structure of 
firms. Menard and Klein (2004, p.750) point out, “These background conditions should 
not be regarded merely as constraints that hamper modernization. They also create 
incentives for the discovery of more efficient modes of organization. Comparing firms 
across different institutional environments to see what settings facilitate organizational 
innovation and what settings hamper it contributes dramatically to our understanding of 
the dynamics of a market economy”. 
China provides an opportunity to explore the interactions between firms and the 
institutional environment. The institutional environment in a transition country like China 
is quite different from those in developed countries such as U.S.A and Western European 
countries. China’s economy is unique in many aspects. There are more than 200 million 
farmer households (i.e. a vast population of 0.8 billion farmers), each farming a plot of 
land that is similar to a garden plot elsewhere. For these small farmers, a major problem 
in the transitory period is the breakdown of the relationships of the farm with input 
suppliers and output markets. They face serious constraints in accessing essential inputs, 
such as feed, fertilizer, seed, capital, and in selling their products. Does the Chinese 
cultural and institutional background matter for the cooperative as a governance 
structure? 
Second, compared with stock listed corporations, cooperatives have their own 
salient characteristics such as member-ownership and member-control (Staatz, 1987; 
Vataliano, 1983; Cook, 1995; Hendrikse and Veerman, 1997; Hendrikse, 1998). 
However, these characteristics are described and examined mainly against the 
background of developed economies/agricultural sectors. Are these characteristics also 
descriptive of agricultural cooperatives in countries in transition? Since the late 1980s, 
new farmer cooperative organizations have emerged and developed rapidly all over 
China. These new cooperative organizations are quite different from the cooperatives in 
the 1950s and 1960s. What are the governance structure choices in these cooperative 
organizations? What are the factors driving such choices? 
Third, appropriately organizing the farmers into the agricultural chain of 
production, transaction and consumption will not only benefit farmers but also benefit the 
overall performance of the economy. As China entered WTO, world industrial markets as 
well as agricultural markets have been affected by this vast economy. The study on how 
to organize and position Chinese farmers in agricultural supply chains is meaningful for 
the health of the Chinese economy as well as the world economy. Are Chinese 
cooperative organizations a feasible organizational form to the organization of farmers in 
an increasingly global agri-food supply chain? 
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The above questions will be addressed in the next sections. The relationship 
between the various questions and sections can be understood from the levels of 
institutional analysis distinguished by Williamson (2000). The most general level is 
Embeddedness, where informal institutions, customs, traditions, norms, and religion are 
at the center of analysis. Change occurs only once in 100-1000 years. The Institutional 
Environment is concerned with the formal rules of the game, like bureaucracy, polity, and 
the judiciary. Change occurs in 10-100 years. Governance is about contracting and 
aligning governance structures with transactions. Changes occur in a time frame of 1-10 
years. Section 2 describes the history of farmer cooperatives in China (2.1), i.e. 
Institutional Environment, and Chinese society (2.2), i.e. Embeddedness. This provides 
the background for our study. Section 3 is institutional analysis at the level of 
Governance. It presents the data regarding 66 farmer cooperatives in Zhejiang province. 
In section 4, we will enrich the observations of section 3 by describing the interaction 
between the attributes governance structure, strategy, and quality control system of a 
specific cooperative. In section 5, we look at these developments from a number of 
theoretical perspectives and formulate various conclusions. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2 Farmer cooperatives in China during the last century 
 
This section consists of two parts. We start with a brief history regarding 
cooperatives in China in subsection 2.1. Subsection 2.2 is dedicated to a number of 
observations regarding Chinese society because it plays a role in understanding farmer 
cooperatives in China. 
 
2.1 One century of cooperatives in China 
 
Cooperative organizations are not new phenomena in China. Their history dates 
back to the beginning of the twentieth century. Five periods are distinguished. First, 
cooperatives emerged in some part of China as early as in 1920s. Cooperatives 
experienced a rapid increase from 722 in 1928 to 168,864 in 1948 (Du, 299). There is no 
detailed information regarding farmer cooperatives during this period, but it is clear that 
they were quite different from what we see today. One main reason is land ownership. 
Independent farmer households were the conventional farming units in the rural China. 
Landlords owned 40% of the cultivated rural land, and leased it to farmer households at a 
very high rent. The rent was often as high as 50% of the value of the crops.  
Second, New China was established by the Communist Party coming to power in 
1949. The central government gradually confiscated land from landlords and rich 
farmers, and then distributed it for free to poor and landless farmers. At the same time, to 
help farmers, who were short of tools and skills, to grow crops efficiently, various kinds 
of cooperative organizations were set up, motivated and later even directly organized by 
the government, to pool resources. Among many cooperative forms, ‘the Mutual Aid 
Team’ was most popular. On the basis of voluntary participation, four or five neighboring 
households pooled farm tools and draft animals and exchanged labor on a temporary or 
permanent basis, while land and harvests still belongs to individual households. From 
1949 to 1955, the cooperative form of ‘Mutual Aid Team’ was adopted as the primary 
way to pool resource in order to increase production. 
Third, from 1955 to 1979, the so-called ‘Cooperative Movement’ took place, and 
cooperative organizations were gradually deprived of their voluntary character and 
became a way for the government to centrally control and manage agricultural production, 
exchange and consumption. Agricultural production became collectivized. The 
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‘Elementary Co-operative’ emerged in 1954 and was the main choice of farmers during 
1954 to 1956. Compared to the Mutual Aid Team, more households (normally 20 or 30) 
participated in the Elementary Co-operative, and members pooled their land, besides 
farm tools and draft animals, together under a unified management. The net income of the 
co-operative was distributed according to two principles: one payment for the input of 
land, draft animals, and farm contributed by each member; one payment for the labor 
input by each member. In this period, the attitude towards the cooperative development 
was cautious, and farmers were encouraged to participate in different kinds of 
cooperative organizations on voluntary basis.  
Among the various cooperative forms, ‘the Advanced Co-operative’ emerged 
around 1955, having a number of salient characteristics. All means of production 
including land were collectively owned, and members worked according to centralized 
management, and remuneration was solely based on the labor input from each member. 
In 1955, the central government decided to accelerate the pace of collectivization. As a 
result, the voluntary participation principle was deliberately omitted and farmers were 
persuaded or forced to participate in the Advance Co-operative. From 500 Advance Co-
operatives in 1955, the number rose toward 753,000 in 1957, covering 119 million 
households.  
In 1958 a new form of cooperative, the so-called ‘People’s Commune’ was 
introduced and played a decisive role in rural areas until 1978. One ‘People’s Commune’ 
consisted of about 30 Advanced Cooperatives and consisted of, on average, 5,000 
households and 10,000 acres of cultivated land. Unified production, management and 
distribution were adopted within the People Commune. Initially, payments in the 
commune was based partly according to subsistence needs and partly according to the 
work performed.  However, delegation of production and management to smaller units, 
i.e. the ‘Production Team’ which consisted of about 20-30 neighboring households, 
occurred in 1962. Since then, production teams were the basic producing, operating and 
accounting unit. Team members grow crops together, and working time was recorded 
under the title of ‘Working Points’. At the end of year, income was distributed to 
individual members according to accumulated working points. The system of collective 
farming remained until 1979.2  
Under the system of collective farming, supplying of farming inputs, producing and 
selling products are all centrally planned by governments. The so-called ‘Supplying and 
Marketing Cooperatives’ in rural areas were government organizations which supplied 
inputs and consumption goods to farmers. Agricultural products were collected and 
distributed by governments, and were normally not allowed to trade freely in markets. In 
general, before 1980s, the ‘Unified Purchasing and Supplying System’ (UPSS, i.e. ‘tong-
gou-tong-xiao’ in Chinese) was adopted as the basic institution governing government 
and farmers regarding producing sales of agricultural products until early 1980s.3  
Fourth, China started an economic and political transition in 1978. Central planning 
of economic activities was gradually transformed to a market-oriented system. This 
ongoing institutional change has far-reaching influences for individuals as well as 
organizations. Firstly, the collective-based farming has been substituted by family-based 
farming. The Household Responsibility System (HRS) was initially adopted in 1978 by 
                                                 
2 One point is worth making here. The cooperative organizations in 1960s and 1970s were not farmer-
owned and farmer-controlled by nature. They turned into government or quasi-government organizations 
performing both economic and political functions.  
3 The central government decided to take ‘planned purchasing and planned supplying’ on oil agri-products 
and grain on November 1953, and expanded the planning spectrum to include cotton on September 1954. 
The policy issued on August 1955 specified the details. 
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the farmers in An’hui province and provided the farmers with temporary control and 
income rights to land. The HRS is characterized by collective ownership of land on the 
one hand and farmer households as independent producing units on the other hand. The 
land is collectively owned by villages, while is leased to the households according to the 
number of people and workers in a household. The tenure specified in the contract was 
set to be one to three years at first, and then was extended to 15 years. In 2002, the 
contract duration for a new round was re-extended to 30 years. The contract specifies the 
household’s obligations to fulfill state procurement quotas and to pay various forms of 
local fees and taxes. The household then retains any residuals in excess of the stated 
obligations. It induces strong incentives for farmers to work and invest in the leased land. 
For example, as the reforms spread rapidly across the other parts of the rural areas, farm 
output rose by more than 30% in six years. 
 Secondly, the centrally planned agri-food purchasing and supplying system was 
gradually transformed to a market-oriented system. As the reform on rural land went on, 
UPSS was progressively abandoned by the government to encourage free trade in 
agricultural markets. As early as 1982, the government encouraged farmers to sell 
products in markets. In 1985, the central government decided to cancel UPSS.4 Since 
then, the government purchases grain and cotton by contracting, and pork, sea-food, 
vegetables and other products are open to free trade. 
As China transits from centrally-planned economy to market-oriented economy, 
traditionally small farmers are facing a new situation. Under the old collective producing 
and distribution system, farmers did not decide what to produce, how much to produce, 
and how to sell products. In the transitory period, they have to make these decisions by 
themselves. However, it is not easy to successfully make such decisions. The survival of 
farmers depends on how, and to what extent, they meet the demands of final consumers. 
It implies that they have to produce efficiently on the one hand, and to predict and meet 
market demands on the other hand. However, it is well known that small farmers lack 
access to inputs, technology, information, and markets. This puts them in a weak position 
in supply chains. Choosing appropriate strategies, which provide the access to inputs, 
technology, information, and markets and to added value of supply chain, is therefore 
crucial to them.   
Motivated by the new situation since the 1980s, new cooperative organizations 
emerged in many provinces of China in the late 1980s. At the beginning, the cooperative 
organizations, called the ‘Technology Association’, were established to communicate and 
promote new technologies among farmers. Local technologists, big specialized growers, 
and science associations were major players initiating and organizing such cooperative 
organizations. As the reform of the agricultural product circulation system proceeded in 
the 1980s, more farmer cooperative organizations emerged. Some cooperative 
organizations operate across different production stages, such as supplying agricultural 
inputs and/or selling products. At the same time, more players are involved in 
establishing cooperative organizations, such as large processing enterprises, state-owned 
supplying and marketing cooperatives, local rural governments, and villages etc. Since 
the 1990s, the development of cooperative organizations is speeding up in many 
provinces. Up to 2004, the number of new cooperative organizations is more than 
150,000 (Green book of china’s rural economy, 2004, p.157).  
The new cooperative organizations that have emerged since the 1980s may take 
different forms. In general, we can distinguish two basic forms: farmer specialized 
                                                 
4 ‘Ten Policies on Further Activate Rural Economy’, issued by the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party and State Council on January 1, 1985, specified the details.  
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associations and farmer specialized cooperatives. Farmer specialized associations account 
for 65% and farmer specialized cooperatives account for 35% of the 150,000 cooperative 
organizations in 2004 (Green book of china’s rural economy, 2004, p.157). The main 
difference between the two forms is the ownership of fixed assets and performing 
functions like production, marketing, or processing. In general, specialized cooperatives 
are registered at the Administration of Industry and Commerce, have fixed assets, and are 
like cooperatives in western countries in terms of their production, marketing, and 
processing activities. Farmer specialized associations are registered at the Civil Affairs 
Bureau, have no fixed assets, charge no membership fee, provide some technical 
assistance, and share information. However, this distinction is too crude. The Farmer 
Specialized Association’ (FSA) is a very broad name, which consists of very large 
association supplying technology, information, to thousands or tens of thousand members 
as well as very small associations communicating technology and experience among 
several farmers. Some specialized associations are even cooperative enterprises and acts 
just like specialized cooperatives. This overlap can be explained partly by the fact that 
there are no cooperative laws in China. Up to May 2005, there are no national 
cooperative laws. At the provincial government level, local laws on cooperatives are also 
limited. The first local cooperative law was enacted by the Zhejiang provincial 
government in January 2005.  
 
2.2 Chinese society 
 
Farmers choose a certain organizational form (i.e., a governance structure) to 
realize a fair return on investment. This choice is not independent of the society in which 
the farmer lives. It is important to realize that a person is not only a natural or economic 
person, but also a social person. He (she) lives in a society, which can be viewed as a 
nexus of various relations. This is particularly true for Chinese farmers with 
characteristics like community life, influence of traditional culture, and the imperfections 
of the current market system. There are three basic ways for most of Chinese farmers to 
participate in the society. The first is kinship, i.e., the relations between an individual and 
his or her spouse, parents, sisters and brothers, and cousins. The second is social relations, 
i.e., the relations between an individual and his or her friends, classmates, and colleagues. 
The third is potential relations, i.e., the relations between an individual and strangers; it is 
actually based on the first two relations. 
The origin and development of farmer cooperatives in China have therefore an 
informal institutional background based on relations. The kinship (or relation) plays an 
important role in the cooperatives. First, as an organization based on the rural 
communities, the farmer cooperative is characterized by kinship. Second, the kinship is 
an important way for Chinese farmers to access to various resources. It’s particularly 
important at the initial stage of farmer cooperatives. Third, the governance and operation 
of farmer cooperatives also relies on the principle of kinship. It’s a principle combining 
kin, loyalty and abilities. Therefore, it’s natural for the farmer cooperatives to have some 
characteristics of traditional social relations in the process of their development and 
operation. Such rural social relations are combined by kinship and market rules. A lot of 
farmer cooperatives in Zhejiang province find an effective balance in such social 
relations. The internal transaction costs based on such relations is quite low.  
 
3 Farmer cooperatives in the Zhejiang province 
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This section presents the data of a sample of 66 farmer cooperatives in Zhejiang 
province in China. Zhejiang province is located south of Shanghai, with 46 million 
inhabitants.  It was the pilot province for farmer specialized cooperative organizations 
chosen by the Ministry of Agriculture, China. To a certain extent, the institutional 
arrangement of farmer cooperatives in Zhejiang not only reflects the common 
characteristics of farmer cooperatives in the coastal areas of China, but may also 
represent the development trend of farmer specialized cooperatives in China.  
Farmer cooperatives in Zhejiang have experienced a rapid development since 1990s. 
Like other regions in China, Zhejiang’s farmer cooperatives can be divided into 
specialized cooperatives and specialized associations. Both specialized cooperatives and 
specialized associations have increased rapidly, however, specialized cooperatives 
increase at faster rate than specialized associations. The farmer specialized cooperatives 
increased from 791 in 2002 to 1,789 in 2004. The number of farmer specialized 
associations was 1,019 in 2004. The total number of the farm households joined in farmer 
cooperatives reached 554,000 and the total number of the farm households involved in 
farmer cooperatives reached 2,029,500 in 2004.5  
A sample of 66 farmer specialized cooperatives was chosen randomly from the 
Zhejiang province. Data regarding ownership structures were collected. Table 1 shows 
the number of members, the number of shareholders, the capital stock, the capital stock 
per-capita, the ratio of shareholders to all members and the shareholding concentration 
rate6.  
  
Co-ops No of member 
No of 
share- 
holder 
Capital 
stock (¥) 
Per-capita 
capital 
stock (¥) 
Share-
holders to 
members 
R1 R3 R5 R8 R10 
Max value 1000 812 7010000.00 584166.67 1.00 0.82 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Min value  36 2 6800.00 47.22 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 
Mean value  259.318 102.485 365089.00 23001.77 0.45 0.25 0.44 0.55 0.64 0.67 
Standard 
deviation 216.944 144.910 896312.41 75027.32 0.42 0.22 0.29 0.32 0.32 0.32 
  Table 1: Ownership structure of 66 sample cooperatives 
 
Several observations can be formulated regarding table 1. Firstly, in our sample of 
66 farmer cooperatives, the size of cooperatives varies a lot. In terms of membership, the 
largest cooperative has 1,000 members, while the smallest cooperative has just 26 
members. In terms of capital stock, the cooperatives vary from as low as 6,800 yuan to 
over 7 million yuan. Table 2 provides the additional information regarding the size 
distribution of cooperatives. The number of cooperatives with more than 500 members 
and the cooperatives with less than 100 members are limited. Over half of cooperatives 
have more than 100 and less than 200 members.  
 
No of members ＞800 ＞500 ＞300 ＞200 ＞100 ＞50 ＞0 
No of co-ops 4 8 20 27 62 65 66 
Frequency (%) 6.06 12.12 30.30 40.91 93.94 98.48 100.00 
                                                 
5 Source: Zhejiang Provincial Department of Agriculture. 
6 Shareholding concentration (Ri) refers to the ratio of the sum of the capital stock owned by the top i 
member(s) in a descending sort to the total capital stock in a cooperative. In 
detail, ∑∑= n im im XXR 11 ( )m n≤ ; Where Xi refers to the sum of the capital stock owned by the top i 
member in a descending sort; where N refers to the number of cooperative members.  
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Table 2: Interval distribution of number of members  
 
Secondly, according to table 1, all cooperatives have shareholders. However, the 
numbers of shareholders of the sample cooperatives varies also drastically. The number 
of shareholders varies from 2 to 812. Table 3 illustrates the interval distribution of the 
number of shareholders in our sample. The cooperatives with more than 200 shareholders 
and these with less than 5 shareholders are fairly limited. 20 cooperatives, almost one 
third of the sample, have between 100 and 200 shareholders; 26 cooperatives, over one 
third of the sample, have between 5 and 30 shareholders.  
 
No of 
shareholders ＞200 ＞100 ＞50 ＞30 ＞10 ＞5 ＞0 
No of  co-ops 9 29 31 34 48 60 66 
Frequency (%) 13.64 43.94 46.97 51.52 72.73 90.91 100.00 
Table 3: Distribution of the number of shareholders 
 
Thirdly, the capital stock of the cooperatives varies between 7,000 and 7,000,000 
yuan; and the per-capita capital stock varies between 50 and 50,000 yuan. Table 4 shows 
the interval distributions of capital stock and per-capita capital stock. Regarding capital 
stocks, only two cooperatives held a capital stock of more than 1,000,000 yuan, and the 
cooperatives with a capital stock of more than 500,000 yuan are limited. For about one 
third of the cooperatives, their capital stock is between 10,000 and 200,000 yuan. 
Regarding per-capita stock, about one third of cooperatives have more than 10,000 yuan 
per-capita capital stock, and about one third of cooperatives have a per-capita capital 
stock between 1,000 and 5,000 yuan. There is only one cooperative with less than 100 
yuan per-capita capital stock, and there are quite a few cooperatives whose per-capital 
capital stock is between 100 and 1,000 yuan. 
 
Capital stock (10,000 ¥) ＞100 ＞50 ＞20 ＞10 ＞5 ＞1 ＞0 
No of co-ops 
Frequency (%) 
2 
3.03 
8 
12.12 
27 
40.91 
42 
63.64 
54 
81.82 
65 
98.48 
66 
100.00 
 
Capital stock per-capita (¥) ＞10000 ＞5000 ＞1000 ＞500 ＞200 ＞100 ＞0 
No of co-ops 
Frequency (%) 
21 
31.82 
26 
39.39 
54 
81.82 
60 
90.91 
62 
93.94 
65 
98.48 
66 
100.00 
Table 4: Interval distributions of capital stock and per-capita capital stock 
 
Fourthly, shareholding among members is pervasive. However, member 
shareholding varies a lot. The rate of shareholders to members is as large as 1 at one 
extreme and as small as 0.01 at the other extreme, with the mean value being equal to 
0.45 (see column 6, table 2). Table 5 further shows the detailed information on members’ 
shareholding. There are strong contrasts on the member shareholding structures in the 
sample. In 21 cooperatives, the rate of shareholder members to all members is higher than 
90%; in 24 cooperatives, this rate is lower than 10%, and in 15 cooperatives, this rate is 
between 10% and 50%. These cooperatives therefore can be divided into two groups: one 
group with high member shareholding, and the other group with low member 
shareholding.  
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Proportion of 
shareholder 
members to all 
members 
 
>0.9 
 
>0.8 
 
>0.7 
 
>0.6 
 
>0.5 
 
>0.4 
 
>0.3 
 
>0.2 
 
>0.1 
 
>0.0 
No of Co-ops 21 23 25 27 27 28 28 36 42 66 
Frequency (%) 31.83 34.85 37.88 40.91 40.91 42.42 42.42 54.55 63.64 100 
Table 5: Interval distribution of the proportion of shareholder members to all members        
 
Fifthly, shareholding is not uniformly distributed among shareholders, and large 
shareholders’ dominance in the provision of capital is salient. Table 1 shows, on average, 
the top 5 largest shareholders account for 50% of the provision of capital in a cooperative, 
and the top 10 largest shareholders contribute for almost two thirds of the capital stock. 
Table 6 further captures how shareholdings are concentrated in cooperatives.  In 11 
cooperatives, the largest shareholder provides more than 50% of equity capital; in 25 
cooperatives, the top three largest shareholders provide more than 50%; the top 5 largest 
shareholders provide more than 50% of equity capital in half of the sample cooperatives. 
  
 Rm> 0.9 
Rm > 
0.8 
Rm> 
0.7 
Rm> 
0.6 
Rm > 
0.5 
Rm > 
0.4 
Rm > 
0.3 
Rm > 
0.2 
Rm > 
0.1 
Rm > 
0.0 
R1 0 1 4 5 11 17 21 26 45 66 
R3 5 9 15 20 25 31 39 47 59 66 
R5 14 18 24 28 33 40 47 57 59 66 
R8 22 26 31 37 40 49 53 58 60 66 
R10 26 31 35 40 42 51 55 58 62 66 
Table 6: Concentration of shareholding 
 
In sum, most cooperatives are small; shareholding is pervasive among most 
cooperatives; the cooperatives are usually composed of a minority of core members 
(usually big shareholders) and a majority of common members (usually users or patrons); 
the cooperatives can be generally divided into two types: one is with a minority of 
members as its shareholders; the other is with a majority or all members as its 
shareholders. For most cooperatives, shareholding is quite concentrated; big shareholders 
play a dominant role in providing capital.  
 
4 Wenling City Yu-heng watermelon cooperative 
 
In this section, we will examine a specific cooperative in the Zhejiang province in 
order to enrich the observations of the previous section. Wenling City Yu-heng 
Watermelon Cooperative (we call it Yu-heng watermelon cooperative hereafter) is 
located in Yuheng town, Wenling city, Zhejiang province.7 It was initiated in July 2001 
by 29 farmers including the present General Director, and was registered as a share-
cooperative enterprise by the local Industry and Commerce Administration in February 
2002. The main business of the cooperative involves growing and selling watermelons.8 
In 2004, it had 129 members with the fixed capital of 2.96 million Yuan. 
Organizations, and therefore cooperatives, can be characterized in many different 
ways. We adopt the systems of attributes characterization of Holmstrom and Milgrom 
(1994). Three clusters of attributes are distinguished in describing this cooperative: 
                                                 
7 Wenling is a city of 780,000 citizens in Zhejiang province, China; Yuheng is a town south of Wenling. 
8 It also sells farming medicines, fertilizer, etc as a side business. 
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governance structure (4.1), quality control system (4.2), and strategy (4.3). We conclude 
the section by paying attention to the complementarities between these attributes (4.4). 
 
4.1 Governance structure 
 
We follow Hansmann (1996) by distinguishing decision and income rights of a 
governance structure. Decision rights specify who directs the firm’s activities, i.e. the 
allocation of authority. Various decision rights in Yu-heng watermelon cooperative will 
be described, like membership composition, share contribution requirement, restricted 
ownership, delivery rights, quasi-individual ownership title, formal versus real authority, 
and member involvement. Income rights specify who appropriates the net earnings of the 
enterprise, i.e. delineate incentives. 
 
Decision rights 
Yu-heng watermelon cooperative has 129 members. Most members are watermelon 
growers and about 20 members are watermelon sellers. The cooperative requires all 
members to buy shares, where the number of the shares which members have to buy is 
determined by the planting scale. The larger the planting scale is, the more shares a 
member has to buy. However, the maximum shareholding for one member is set to be 
20%.  
Membership is closed in this cooperative. Although the charter stipulates the 
membership policy as ‘free entry and free exit’, the practice of membership is different. 
On the one hand, to become a member, farmer growers have to reach a certain scale of 
growing watermelons and have to meet a certain technical requirement. The cooperative 
is very cautious to accept new members. For example, the cooperative will monitor the 
performance of a potential member for one year before making a final decision. On the 
other hand, to leave the cooperative, current members are required to submit a written 
application to the cooperative. The member can get their equity investment back when 
the application to leave is accepted by the board of directors. However, current members 
are not allowed to leave when the cooperative is experiencing losses.  
Delivery rights are restricted in Yu-heng Watermelon Cooperative. Firstly, delivery 
rights are restricted in terms of quality requirements. Members have rights to deliver 
products to the cooperative, but their products must meet ex ante specified quality 
standards. Sample inspection and internal grading will be used to distinguish high quality 
products from low quality products. Secondly, delivery rights are restricted in sense that 
the delivery amount for one member is almost ex ante determined. 
Although Yu-heng Watermelon Cooperative is collectively owned by members, 
each member’s claim on the cooperative seems to be clearly defined.  Firstly, individual 
members’ ownership is specified in terms of shares. Members are required to buy shares 
according to their planting capability/expected patronization. Secondly, the cooperative 
allows the members to participate in decision making according to shareholding structure. 
The one-member-one-vote principle is substituted by the restricted one-share-one-vote 
principle. The latter voting rights will motivate members to collect/commute information 
to participate in management of cooperatives. Thirdly, shares can be redeemed when 
members quit cooperative. Thus, members can get back his financial stakes in 
cooperatives.  These facts illustrate that the ownership title is not strictly collective. 
However, the ownership title can not be viewed as individual either. Property rights in the 
cooperative can not be traded outside the cooperative. When transferring the property 
rights within the cooperative, it is the board of directors, not the involved members, 
having the power to decide whether the transaction can be performed. In sum, the 
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ownership title in the cooperative is a hybrid-form between individual one and collective 
one. ‘Quasi-individual’ may be a suitable name.    
Ownership defines the allocation of formal authority. Figure 1 captures how formal 
authority is allocated in this cooperative. It resides with the member (representative) 
assembly. The (representative) assembly provides members with formal channels to 
revise organizational charters, elect and/or replace board members, determine finance and 
development plan, determine total share-value, per-share-value and the maximum 
number of shares purchased by one member, decide issues regarding merger, 
cooperation, etc. The member assembly will meet once or twice a year. When it is 
difficult for all members to come all together, members elect the representatives. The 
representative members constitute the representative assembly. Representative members 
have a three-year term and could be re-elected for many terms. Members participate in 
the (representative) member assembly by a restricted ‘one-share-one-vote’ principle. 
Voting rights are based on ‘one-share-one-vote’, but one member has at most 20 votes. 
The decision making process in the (representative) member assembly is by a qualified 
majority. A decision is reached when more than 2/3 of the votes are in favor. 
 
Figure 1 Allocation of Formal Authority 
 
Although formal authority clearly resides with the members and the assembly, real 
authority may reside with the others. Actually, many decisions have to be delegated to 
other groups. Normally, these groups include the board of directors and/or a group of 
managers. In Yu-heng Watermelon Cooperative, the board of directors is having effective 
control of the cooperative. The board consists of three members, and they are elected by 
the general assembly. The General Director is elected by the board and is the legal 
representative of the cooperative.  
The board of supervisors is assigned with the rights to monitor the board of 
directors. The board of supervisors consists of 3 members elected by the (representative) 
member assembly. The supervisor members have a three-year term and can be re-elected 
for multiple terms. The supervisor members are expected to be independent from director 
members, thus, the charter clearly stipulates that the current director members and 
recently retired members and their relatives can not be supervisor members. 
The allocation of real authority may vary widely within one formal organizational 
arrangement. This issue is illustrated by the outcome of a short questionnaire on the 
involvement of non-director members in decision making. The results are summarized in 
table 7.  
First, members give up their decision rights regarding inputs and price to director 
members. The cooperative requires standardization of production by members. What 
inputs are to be used, and how/when to use them are contracted ex ante between the 
cooperatives and members. For the cooperative, this is a method to control quality of 
products; for the members, they like to give up such decision rights to gain technical 
guidance on how to produce and to acquire inputs such as fertilizers and seeds supplied 
by the cooperative at production costs. The members give up their decision rights 
The (representative) 
member assembly 
The board of directors 
The board of supervisors 
Other executive offices 
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regarding price because their production scale is small and the inefficiencies in 
information collection. For member growers, small production scale implies that it is 
costly to collect market information and it is hard to access markets. In contrast, the 
cooperatives have better capabilities to gather and analyze market information and a 
larger scale to gain access to markets. 
 
 No extent or 
to a very limited extent 
To some extent To large extent 
Input decision ×   
Quantity decision   × 
Price decision ×   
Quality standards decision   × 
Accounting system decision  ×  
Advertisement decision    
Technology training decision   × 
Investment decision   × 
Financing decision  ×  
Recruiting decision  ×  
Table 7: Allocation of Decision Power to non-Director Members 
 
Second, non-Director members are actively involved in making such decisions as 
quantity, quality standards, technology training, and investment. Quantity decisions are 
important for all members, because how much to produce will determine how much to 
contribute to the cooperative by buying shares. Normal members are motivated enough to 
participate in this decision. Regarding the high involvement of normal members in setting 
up quality standards decisions, it reflects that quality is now an important attribute of 
commodities. Since cooperatives are organized around one or several similar products, 
formulating quality standards is an important measure to regulate members’ behavior and 
reduce the adverse selection problem.  
It is not surprising that members are strongly motivated to take technical training 
decisions. In China, small farmer growers are lack of technology. As the market 
condition changes from shortage of supply to abundance of supply, consumers demand 
high quality products or more customer-friendly products. To meet such changes, new 
technologies and technological innovations are required. Because small growers are keen 
on technological training, they are motivated to decide the training projects and training 
frequency. The result is that providing technology services is one of important measures 
to test the performance of Chinese cooperatives. 
Third, financing decisions are mainly made by director members. This observation 
is a bit surprising, because normal members are expected to be cautious for financial 
issues in order to prevent risks and therefore are expected to tightly keep decision rights 
on financing.  The reason is that normal members are too small to take a stake in 
financing and director members are normally larger growers who contribute a lot to 
financing issues. For example, the general director is a big grower, and his shares count 
for 20% of all shares.  
In sum, in Yu-heng Watermelon Cooperative, ownership is restricted to members; 
members are required to buy shares; membership is closed; delivery rights are restricted; 
the ownership title is quasi-individual; director members have substantial power in 
deciding prices, inputs, finance, recruiting, etc; non-director members participate actively 
in making most decisions regarding quantity, quality, standards, investments, and 
technological training.  
 
Income Rights 
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The cooperative will allocate the shares among members according to their planting 
scale, which in turn determine their expected patronization on the cooperative. Since the 
share allocation is set up before the production of watermelon, the expected patronization 
and consequently the payment for delivering for individual members are almost fixed. By 
combining delivery rights and share-holding policy, the cooperative aligns the principle 
of patronization-based allocation with the principle of share-based allocation. Since 
member growers are required to purchase shares on the basis of expected patronage, the 
usage and the capital investment are perfectly aligned. 
Members have rights to share the yearly net returns of the cooperative according to 
shares. Generally, some parts of the share yearly net returns will be retained within the 
cooperative for further development and public use, and the rest will be allocated to 
members according to their shares. Yu-heng Watermelon Cooperative does not directly 
allocate returns to members, because there are sub-units called ‘production bases’. These 
production bases are not only the units performing production tasks allocated by the 
cooperative, but also the units of accounting and allocating surplus. For each production 
base, the surplus to be allocated is the net returns in a production season deducted by the 
cost of production and management. The cooperative collects the risk insurance fund 
(10%) 9 and the public accumulation and public benefit fund (5%) from each production 
base; the rest of the allocable surplus in each production base is allocated to the base 
members proportional to individuals’ shares. Since the shares are determined ex ante by 
expected patronage of the cooperative, allocation by shares/capital are perfectly aligned 
with allocation by patronage. In sum, members share the benefits (or costs) of the 
cooperative according to shares. The cooperative takes quality considerations into 
account in its pricing policy. It will pay different prices according to grading. In some 
cases, members are even punished (fined) to deliver bad products. 
 
Complementarities between decision rights and income rights 
Table 8 presents the values of the attributes of the governance structure in Yu-heng 
watermelon cooperative. Decision rights are not uniformly distributed among the 
members. Director members have real control on important issues such as pricing, 
financing, investment screening, etc. Meanwhile, sharing benefits/costs among members 
are not solely based on membership. Income rights are confined by share contributions. 
 
                       Income rights 
 
Decision rights 
 
Share-based Membership-
based 
Uniform   
Skewed ×  
Table 8: Attribute choices in the cluster Governance 
 
In traditional cooperatives, benefit sharing based on patronization is essential for 
members, and capital returns are not important or deliberately limited to all members. In 
Yu-heng watermelon cooperative, ownership is allocated in such a way that benefit 
sharing based on patronization and benefit sharing based on capital contribution is 
                                                 
9 Note that the risk insurance fund is used for reimbursement for heavy losses caused by the production and 
marketing of production bases and is allocated to each member’s share account according to shares. For 
example, in 2003, one production base suffered a great loss from bad weather. The average loss for the 
members of this base was about 8,000 yuan per mu. The cooperative used the insurance fund to reimburse a 
part of loss of this production base. After reimbursing, members of this base lost only 2,000 yuan per mu. 
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perfectly aligned. Since members benefit from the cooperative proportional to their share 
contribution/expected patronization, a skewed allocation of decision rights encourages 
members either to contribute to the cooperative or to make knowledge / access to market 
channels available. 
 
4.2 Quality control system 
 
For agricultural products, as well as for other products, quality is an important 
attribute nowadays. The importance of quality is particularly pronounced for fruits and 
vegetables because these commodities are among the most likely to be observed and 
evaluated by consumers in their primary and unprocessed form. However, member 
growers have more information on quality of products than the cooperatives. Asymmetric 
information on quality may lead to over-supply of low quality products. Thus, quality 
management is essential for cooperatives. Markets coordinate quality mainly by 
incentives (such as prices), and hierarchies coordinate quality mainly by administrative 
controls (monitoring of the activities). We define the system a cooperative uses to direct 
behavior of its member users and to motivate them to act in ways that benefit the 
cooperative as the quality control system. 
 
Quality coordination methods through multiple production stages 
For the agri-business involved in multiple stages of production and distribution of 
products, vertical coordination on quality is necessary. Various methods could be used to 
vertically manage quality. We identify three quality coordination methods through 
multiple production stages in this cooperative: inputs control, production standardization, 
and unified packaging and marketing. Figure 2 illustrates the production stages involved 
by the cooperative and coordinating methods through these stages. 
 
 
Figure 2 Stages of Production and Coordination methods 
 
Although Yu-heng watermelon cooperative is a marketing cooperative, its activities 
are not limited to selling. The figure shows the cooperative is involved in multiple stages 
of inputs, storing, and processing and marketing/retailing. Yu-heng watermelon 
cooperative purchases inputs for members from outside companies. The procurement of 
inputs by the cooperative serves two purposes: firstly, quality of inputs is controlled; 
Inputs Preparing  
site 
Planting Harvest Storage Processing Marketing 
Retailing  
The Cooperative
Farmer growers 
Unified 
supplying 
of inputs Standardization production 
Unified packaging 
and marketing 
Planning 
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secondly, members acquire inputs at cheaper prices because the cooperative has 
considerable bargaining power towards input suppliers. 
Main activities of member growers are preparing sites, planting, and harvesting. 
The cooperative influences member growers’ activities by production standardization 
requirements. Production methods, technical guidance, and detailed planting descriptions 
of production procedures are formulated by the cooperative. All members receive a 
guidance book with detailed standardized growing procedures, specifying detailed 
requirements regarding seeds, fertilizers, production procedures, and technologies 
regarding different stages of production. In sum, the cooperative coordinates members’ 
production in multiple stages of production by a unified supply of inputs, standardized 
production requirements, and unified packaging and marketing. 
 
Other control tools and incentive tools  
In addition to unified supply of inputs, standardized production methods, and 
unified packaging and marketing, several other control instruments are identified. One 
control instrument is team based production / inspection. By working together on rural 
lands, member growers supervise each other. Production and quality management is 
organized in a three-layer structure. Figure 3 depicts this structure. The board of directors, 
on behalf of the cooperative, rents rural land each year and assigns members to grow 
watermelons on it. These lands are called ‘production bases’. In 2004, the cooperative 
had 8 production bases across the Zhejiang province. In 2005, the cooperative has 12 
production bases. In each production base, member growers are grouped into 8 to 10 
production groups. Each group hires farmer employees. The normal ratio is 1 farmer 
member to 3 hired farmer workers. These farmer workers are paid 900 yuan per month. 
Farmer members and workers grow watermelons together in a team. The cooperative 
provides inputs such as seeds, fertilizers and technical assistance. Farmer members 
provide technical guidance to farmer employees. At the end of one production cycle10, 
each production base collects watermelons from its production teams. These watermelons 
are sorted, graded and packed with the cooperative brand. The board of directors 
determines prices based on the market situation. Subsequently, the cooperative assigns 
about two seller members to each production base. These seller members are in charge of 
selling watermelons for their production base. 
 
Figure 3: Quality management in Yu-heng watermelon cooperative 
 
Second, the products delivered by members are sorted and graded by the 
cooperative. By sorting and grading, the cooperative encourages members to adhere to ex 
ante specified quality standards. Third, members will be paid for their deliveries based on 
                                                 
10 The number of production cycles is 6, due to its technology and skills. Most enterprises have 4 
production cycles. 
The board of directors 
Production bases 
Production teams 
Member growers Farmer employees 
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quality. Sample inspection, internal grading and sorting are used to measure quality 
differences, and then prices are paid accordingly. Quality-based pricing for deliveries is a 
salient incentive tool used by the cooperative to align interests of individual members 
with the entire cooperative. 
Fourth, there is cash punishment for failing to deliver quality, even after the internal 
inspection process. It entails that a customer receives another watermelon when a bad one 
is returned. This instrument of quality control is explicitly used in the marketing policy 
for selling fresh watermelons. It is called ‘double paying compensation’. Since the 
production team of each watermelon can be traced, all team members will be fined with a 
certain amount of money when losses occur due to delivering bad quality. A larger loss 
results in a higher cash punishment. This policy increases the incentives for group 
member’ to monitor each other during production as well as incentives for team 
supervisors to strictly inspect sorting and grading. 
 
Complementarities in the quality control system 
In Yu-heng watermelon cooperative, the control tools include inputs control (i.e. 
unified supply of inputs), standardization, unified packaging and marketing, group 
production/inspection, sorting and grading, and incentive tools like quality-based pricing 
and cash punishment. The control tools are less efficient when pricing for deliveries is 
identical across all members. Tight control tools and flexible quality-sensitive pricing act 
in the same direction to manage members to adhere to quality standards and maintain the 
brand name. Table 9 depicts the choices regarding the attributes in the cluster quality 
control at Yu-heng watermelon cooperative. Compared with contract farming, the 
cooperative has low costs in enforcing quality. For example, field visits are not necessary, 
because members are motivated to supervise each other to prevent opportunist behavior. 
Low cost of control, complemented with high-powered incentives in terms of pricing, 
makes the cooperative efficient in managing quality in various stages of production. 
 
                    Quality incentives 
Control 
 
Yes No 
Tight X  
Loose   
Table 9: Attribute choices in the cluster Quality Control 
 
There are ongoing debates on whether incentives and control tools adopted in the 
quality assurance system are substitutes or complements. Hueth, e.a. (2000) examined 
incentive tools and control tools used in the contracts used by first handlers of fruits and 
vegetables in California, and claimed that the instruments of control may be complements 
or substitutes, depending on the context. If the control instruments and the incentive 
instruments are complements, then their alignment produces synergies in the Quality 
control system. This is what we observed in this Chinese fruit cooperative. 
 
4.3 Branding strategy and its enforcement mechanisms 
 
A cooperative may choose different business strategies when selling products for 
members. For example, it may just pool all products delivered by members together and 
sell them by batches at wholesale markets; or, it may sell the products under one or 
several brand names. We define the branding strategy as the way in which products are 
marketed and sold under brand name. 
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The branding strategy determines the degree of commitment to ex ante specified 
high quality standards by a firm. To make this commitment credible, firms should have 
something valuable to loose. In Yu-heng watermelon cooperative, this is the private 
brand ‘Yu-ling’. There are two mechanisms to signal quality to consumers: private 
brands and public certification (Raynaud, e.a., 2005). The reputation capital of the owner 
is at stake under a private brand. The general director is a big watermelon grower and at 
the same time an expert in growing watermelons. Before he joined the cooperative, his 
watermelons were recognized as high quality. Many local people buy the watermelon 
from the cooperative because they trust the general director. His personal reputation is at 
stake in building up the reputation for the ‘Yu-ling’ brand. Under public certification, the 
credibility of a quality label relies on governmental enforcement. 
Since the two mechanisms play similar roles in signaling quality, they may act as 
substitutes. However, in Yu-heng watermelon cooperative, public certification is not a 
substitute to private brands. It acts as a major method for building up the reputation of the 
private brand. The cooperative entered the certification process of the local government, 
which resulted in ‘Yu-ling’ being certified as ‘Famous Brand in Zhejiang’ by the 
Zhejiang provincial government agency in 2004. One reason for public certification being 
a complement to private brands is that the costs of public certification are low. Actually, 
local governments encourage cooperatives to participate in public certification 
procedures. Another reason is that public certification is used in advertising in addition to 
the private brand. The general director stated that the advertisement expenditure on 
newspapers, television, etc is ‘very limited’, while pubic certification or public rewards 
are necessary for promoting brands. Table 10 summarizes the observations regarding the 
cluster Strategy. 
 
            Public certification 
 
Private brand 
 
Yes No 
Yes X  
No   
Table 10: Attribute choices in the cluster Strategy 
 
4.4 Complementarities between the three clusters of attributes 
 
How to sell products and what products to sell are two questions closely linked with 
each other. The branding strategy distinguishes itself in terms of creating the commitment 
to ex ante specified high quality standards and creating a new market niche with higher 
margins. To guarantee the commitment and to earn high margins, tight quality control is 
essential in cooperatives taking the brand strategy. The adoption of these systems is 
facilitated by having centralized / skewed governance. Figure 4 depicts the three clusters 
of attributes in Yu-heng watermelon cooperative. 
In Yu-heng watermelon cooperative, the quality control system is tight in order to 
maintain high quality reputation/image of the cooperative. It is tight in three ways. Firstly, 
there are ex-ante contracted quality standards, which are agreed upon by all members and 
which are stricter than the legal requirements regarding fruits. Secondly, many control 
tools are adopted to monitor and guide members through different stages of production. 
For example, input controls, production standardization, and group production/inspection 
are adopted to guarantee quality before and during the production process. Sample 
inspection and internal grading are used to measure members’ efforts in meeting quality 
requirements. Failures of meeting quality requirements, which are not detected by the 
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internal grading system, are dealt with by cash punishments. Since the bad products can 
be tracked down to production bases/groups, cash punishment provides a strong incentive 
to grow high quality watermelons. Thirdly, quality-based pricing is used to complement 
the control tools. 
 
Figure 4: Cluster choices in Yu-heng watermelon cooperative 
 
5 Governance in the Institutional Environment of China: abilities and relations 
 
The above sections show that the development of Chinese cooperatives is 
characterized by two facts. Firstly, the number of new cooperatives increases rapidly all 
over China. The emergence and spread of new cooperatives in China is in line with the 
wave of the agricultural industrialization and global competition. For farmers operating in 
only one stage of the supply chain, i.e. the production stage, their benefits are endangered 
by the potential appropriation by other players in the supply chain. The cooperative is a 
safeguard to guarantee farmers’ benefits by creating access to markets and produce value-
added activities. 
In the process of forward integrating into downstream activities, such as wholesaling 
and/or retailing, physical assets such as preservation facilities and wholesale markets are 
important. However, human assets such as knowledge/abilities regarding marketing and 
advanced technology are more important for Chinese farmers. Firstly, the agri-food 
markets are now characterized by oversupply, i.e. selling products is a problem for most 
farmers. Access to markets is decisive for farmers’ survival. Secondly, in rural China, it 
is very difficult for farmers to get loans from business organizations such as banks 
because their scale is small and they may pose substantial risks for creditors. Only 
farmers with access to knowledge regarding technology and/or markets can get loans. 
These farmers are able to grow more products and/or sell more products. They 
distinguish themselves from other farmers by larger planting and/or selling scale. These 
Uniform 
Skewed 
Tight 
Loose 
No
Yes 
Governance
Quality control 
Branding 
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signals give banks and other private creditors confidence that their loans will be paid 
back. So, human assets pave the way to build up physical assets.  
Secondly, the governance structure of Chinese farmer cooperatives is a co-
governance structure based on abilities and relations. The actual arrangements and 
operations are mainly based on the abilities of members. Trust and commitment derived 
from members’ relationships sustains these institutional arrangements by confining 
control rights to core members. 
The governance structure of Chinese cooperatives varies substantially. Members are 
heterogeneous in terms of farm size and supply of equity, and in some cases farmer 
members jointly own the cooperative with non-farmer members or firm members. The 
allocation of resources based on capital is pervasive at least in the coastal areas. There is 
usually a minority of core members (usually big shareholders) and a majority of normal 
members (usually users or patrons). Normal members enforce control rights by vote, 
voice and exit on the one hand, and delegate most control rights to core members on the 
other hand. 
Farmers are heterogonous in terms of producing and/or selling capability even when 
they produce similar products. Farmers are stratified in terms of their abilities in 
producing products and in accessing markets. Some farmers have these abilities, while 
most farmers have not. However, farmers are in general in a weak bargaining position 
with other players in the agri-food supply chain, regardless their abilities to sell products 
and to perform value-added activities. Uniting farmers and pooling resources in the 
formation of cooperatives seems to be a suitable strategy for both types of farmers. 
According to the incomplete contracting theory, it’s efficient to allocate the control 
rights of cooperatives to the persons with superior access to market channels or having 
specific skills. In China, these persons are big farmer growers and/or sellers because they 
have either the abilities or relations to access downstream markets. They are granted 
substantial power in decision making decision in contingent situations. This is reflected 
in the skewness of the distribution of decision rights among core members/director 
members and normal members in the Zhejiang province. If there is a lack of big 
growers/sellers, agricultural firms and other non-farmers may be chosen and accepted by 
farmer members. The heterogeneity is much larger in this case, and the extent of the 
delegation of control rights to such core members is much larger. In some cases, normal 
members (pure farmer growers) only buy basic shares (i.e. membership shares) to get 
access to the cooperative, and most control rights are granted to big shareholders/core 
members. These diverse allocations of decision power among different stakeholders are 
confined by trust and commitment derived from the relationships among members. For 
small cooperatives, relationships play an important role in building trust and 
commitment. If core members have more close relationship with other members, normal 
members will be more willing to transfer (part of their) control rights to them. Thus, 
dominance of core members in ownership, and hence in residual control rights, is 
sustainable on the basis of kinships. 
 
6 Conclusions 
 
Since the late 1980s, China has seen the rapid development of new cooperatives in 
rural areas. In general, the development of farmer cooperatives in China is still in an early 
stage. They are small, and most of them are local.  
The organization and strategy of farmer specialized cooperatives in China are deeply 
influenced by the institutional environment. Firstly, human asset specificity in terms of 
establishing and maintaining relations and access to markets seems to be more important 
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than physical asset specificity in accounting for governance structure choice in the 
current institutional setting. The leader of a cooperative is chosen mainly by his ability to 
access to downstream activities. A non-farmer or process firm can be accepted as a core 
member as long as he facilitates members’ access to knowledge and/or markets. Core 
members/ director members are endowed with substantial decision power by normal 
members.  
Secondly, farmer cooperatives in China are rooted in the Chinese traditional culture 
centering on personal relations. Therefore, the origin and development of cooperatives 
are not only determined by members’ abilities but also subject to the informal institutions 
based on relations. A very effective way to conduct the governance of farmer 
cooperatives in China may not be formal institution of, and commitment to cooperative 
concepts, but the personal relations or feelings. In a sense, the network of cooperative 
members is an effective mechanism to control the core members. In short, both the 
control of core members based on ability and the constraints caused by members’ 
relations can be regarded as the basic foundation for the co-governance of farmer 
cooperatives in China.  
Heterogeneity of members in farmer cooperatives in China is pervasive. This raises 
the issue on structuring cooperatives in such a way that they accommodate member 
heterogeneity best. There are various types of heterogeneity. Firstly, small farmer 
members and large farmer members co-exist in a cooperative. They are different in terms 
of abilities and social relations. Secondly, in some cooperatives, there are seller members 
who are specialized in selling member's products instead of production, and they may 
have different interests than pure farmer growers. Thirdly, in the cooperatives initiated by 
processor firms or other agri-food business firms, farmer members as well as non farmer 
members have decision rights. Fourthly, there are cooperatives with full-time farmer 
members and part-time farmer having different interests. Finally, members are 
heterogeneous in terms of education, age, gender of members. The first three types of 
heterogeneity have been addressed by this article, but more research is needed to advance 
our knowledge of the impact of member heterogeneity on the organizing and strategy of 
cooperatives. 
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